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Abstract
Deep neural networks have been shown to suffer from a surprising weakness: their classification outputs
can be changed by small, non-random perturbations of their inputs. This adversarial example phenomenon
has been explained as originating from deep networks being “too linear” (Goodfellow et al., 2014). We
show here that the linear explanation of adversarial examples presents a number of limitations: the formal
argument is not convincing; linear classifiers do not always suffer from the phenomenon, and when they do
their adversarial examples are different from the ones affecting deep networks.
We propose a new perspective on the phenomenon. We argue that adversarial examples exist when the
classification boundary lies close to the submanifold of sampled data, and present a mathematical analysis
of this new perspective in the linear case. We define the notion of adversarial strength and show that it
can be reduced to the deviation angle between the classifier considered and the nearest centroid classifier.
Then, we show that the adversarial strength can be made arbitrarily high independently of the classification
performance due to a mechanism that we call boundary tilting. This result leads us to defining a new
taxonomy of adversarial examples. Finally, we show that the adversarial strength observed in practice is
directly dependent on the level of regularisation used and the strongest adversarial examples, symptomatic
of overfitting, can be avoided by using a proper level of regularisation.
1 Introduction
Tremendous progress has been made in the field of Deep Learning in recent years. Convolutional Neural Networks
in particular, started to deliver promising results in 2012 on the ImageNet Large Scale Visual Recognition
Challenge (Krizhevsky et al., 2012). Since then, improvements have come at a very high pace: the range of
applications has widened (Xu et al., 2015; Mnih et al., 2015), network architectures have become deeper and
more complex (Szegedy et al., 2015; Simonyan and Zisserman, 2014), training methods have improved (He et al.,
2015a), and other important tricks have helped increase classification performance and reduce training time
(Srivastava et al., 2014; Ioffe and Szegedy, 2015). As a consequence, deep networks that are able to outperform
humans are now being produced: for instance on the challenging imageNet dataset (He et al., 2015b), or on face
recognition (Schroff et al., 2015). Yet the same networks present a surprising weakness: their classifications are
extremely sensitive to some small, non-random perturbations (Szegedy et al., 2013). As a result, any correctly
classified image possesses adversarial examples: perturbed images that appear identical (or nearly identical) to
the original image according to human observers — and hence that should belong to the same class — that
are classified differently by the networks (see figure 1). There seems to be a fundamental contradiction in the
existence of adversarial examples in state-of-the-art neural networks. On the one hand, these classifiers learn
powerful representations on their inputs, resulting in high performance classification. On the other hand, every
image of each class is only a small perturbation away from an image of a different class. Stated differently, the
classes defined in image space seem to be both well-separated and intersecting everywhere. In the following, we
refer to this apparent contradiction as the adversarial examples paradox.
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(a) Adversarial example with GoogLeNet on Ima-
geNet.
(b) Left: original images from MNIST. Right: ad-
versarial examples with logistic regression.
Figure 1: Adversarial examples for two different models (from (Goodfellow et al., 2014)).
In section 2, we present two existing answers to this paradox including the currently accepted linear expla-
nation of Goodfellow et al. (2014). In section 3, we argue that the linear explanation presents a number of
limitations: the formal argument is unconvincing; we can define classes of images on which linear models do not
suffer from the phenomenon; and the adversarial examples affecting logistic regression on the 3s vs 7s MNIST
problem appear qualitatively very different from the ones affecting GoogLeNet on ImageNet. In section 4, we
introduce the boundary tilting perspective. We start by presenting a new pictorial solution to the adversarial
examples paradox: a submanifold of sampled data, intersected by a class boundary that lies close to it, suffers
from adversarial examples. Then we develop a mathematical analysis of the new perspective in the linear case.
We define a strict condition for the non-existence of adversarial examples, from which we deduce a measure of
strength for the adversarial examples affecting a class of images. Then we show that the adversarial strength
can be reduced to a simple parameter: the deviation angle between the weight vector of the classifier considered
and the weight vector of the nearest centroid classifier. We also show that the adversarial strength can become
arbitrarily high without affecting performance when the classification boundary tilts along a component of low
variance in the data. This result leads us to defining a new taxonomy of adversarial examples. Finally, we
show experimentally using SVM that the adversarial strength observed in practice is controlled by the level of
regularisation used. With very high regularisation, the phenomenon of adversarial examples is minimised and
the classifier defined converges towards the nearest centroid classifier. With very low regularisation however, the
training data is overfitted by boundary tilting, leading to the existence of strong adversarial examples.
2 Previous Explanations
2.1 Low-probability “pockets” in the manifold
In (Szegedy et al., 2013), the existence of adversarial examples was regarded as an intriguing phenomenon. No
detailed explanation was proposed, and only a simple analogy was introduced:
“Possible explanation is that the set of adversarial negatives is of extremely low probability, and thus
is never (or rarely) observed in the test set, yet it is dense (much like the rational numbers), and so
it is found virtually near every test case” [emphasis added]
Using the mathematical concept of density, and the example of the rational numbers in particular, we can
indeed define a classifier that suffers from the phenomenon of adversarial examples. Consider the classifier C
operating on the real numbers with the following decision rule for a test number x:
• x belongs to + if it is positive irrational or negative rational.
• x belongs to − if it is negative irrational or positive rational.
On a test set selected at random among real numbers, C discriminates perfectly between positive and negative
numbers: real numbers contain infinitely more irrational numbers than rational numbers and for whatever test
number x we choose at random among real numbers, x is infinitely likely to be irrational, and thus correctly
classified. Yet C suffers from the phenomenon of adversarial examples: since the set of rational numbers is dense
in the set of real numbers, x is infinitely close to rational numbers that constitute adversarial examples.
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The rational numbers analogy is interesting, but it leaves one important question open: why would deep
networks define decision rules that are in any way as strange as the one defined by our example classifier C? By
what mechanism should the low-probability “pockets” be created? Without attempting to provide a detailed
answer, Szegedy et al. (2013) suggested that it was made possible by the high non-linearity of deep networks.
2.2 Linear explanation
Goodfellow et al. (2014) subsequently provided a more detailed analysis of the phenomenon, and introduced the
linear explanation — currently generally accepted. Their explanation relies on a new analogy:
“We can think of this as a sort of ‘accidental steganography’, where a linear model is forced to attend
exclusively to the signal that aligns most closely with its weights, even if multiple signals are present
and other signals have much greater amplitude.” [emphasis added]
Given an input x and an adversarial example x˜ = x+ η where η is subject to the constraint ‖η‖∞ < , the
argument is the following:
“Consider the dot product between a weight vector w and an adversarial example x˜:
w> · x˜ = w> · x+w> · η
The adversarial perturbation causes the activation to grow by w> ·η. We can maximise this increase
subject to the max norm constraint on η by assigning η =  sign(w). If w has n dimensions and
the average magnitude of an element of the weight vector is m, then the activation will grow by mn.
Since ‖η‖∞ does not grow with the dimensionality of the problem but the change in activation caused
by the perturbation by η can grow linearly with n, then for high dimensional problems, we can make
many infinitesimal changes to the input that add up to one large change to the output.”
The authors concluded that “a simple linear model can have adversarial examples if its input has sufficient
dimensionality”. This argument was followed with the observation that small linear movements in the direction
of the sign of the gradient (with respect to the input image) can cause deep networks to change their predictions,
and hence that “linear behaviour in high-dimensional spaces is sufficient to cause adversarial examples”.
Technical remarks:
1. What norm should be used to evaluate the magnitude of a small perturbation? The image perturbations
used to generate adversarial examples are typically measured with a norm that does not necessarily
match perceptual magnitude. For instance, Goodfellow et al. (2014) use the infinity norm, based on
the idea that digital measuring devices are insensitive to small perturbations whose infinity norm is
below a certain threshold (because of digital quantization). This is a reasonable but arbitrary choice.
We might consider other norms more adapted (such as 1- or 2-norm) — because for human observers,
the magnitude of a perturbation does not only depend on the maximum change along individual pixels
but also on the number of changing pixels1. This is a fairly technical point of little importance in
practice, except for determining the specific direction in which to move when looking for adversarial
examples. We use the 2-norm, so that the direction we move in is simply the direction of the gradient.
In other words, we create adversarial examples by adding the quantity w/‖w‖2 to the input image,
instead of adding the quantity  sign(w), as one does for the infinity norm.
2. In previous works, the phenomenon of adversarial examples in linear classification was investigated
using logistic regression (Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al., 2014). In the present study, we
use another standard linear classifier: support vector machine (SVM) with linear kernel. The two
methods are largely equivalent but we prefer SVM for its geometrical interpretation, more adapted to
the boundary tilting perspective we introduce in the following.
1A perturbation of  on the pixel in the top left corner of an image does not have the same perceptual magnitude as a perturbation
of  across the entire image. Yet the infinity norm gives the same magnitude to the two perturbations.
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3 Limitations with the Linear Explanation
3.1 An unconvincing argument
The idea of accidental steganography is a seducing intuition that seems to illustrate well the phenomenon
of adversarial examples. Yet the argument is unconvincing: small perturbations do not provoke changes in
activation that grow linearly with the dimensionality of the problem, when they are considered relatively to the
activations themselves. Consider the dot product between a weight vector w and an adversarial example x˜ again:
w> · x˜ = w> ·x+w> ·η. As we have seen before, the change in activation w> ·η grows linearly with the problem;
but so does the activation w> ·x (provided that the weight and pixel distributions in w and x stay unchanged),
and the ratio between the two quantities stays constant.
We illustrate this by performing linear classification on a modified version of the 3s vs 7s MNIST problem
where the image size has been increased to 200× 200. We generated the new dimensions by linear interpolation
and increased variability by adding some noise to the original and the modified datasets (random perturbations
between [−0.05, 0.05] on every pixel). The results for the two image sizes look strikingly similar (see figure 2).
Importantly, increasing the image resolution has no influence on the perceptual magnitude of the adversarial
perturbations, even if the dimension of the problem has been multiplied by more than 50.
(a) 3s vs 7s MNIST problem with an image size of
28× 28. Left: weight vector defined by linear SVM.
Right: example digits (top) and their adversarial ex-
amples (bottom).
(b) 3s vs 7s MNIST problem with an image size of
200× 200. Left: weight vector defined by linear SVM.
Right: the same example digits (top) and their adver-
sarial examples (bottom).
Figure 2: Increasing the dimensionality of the problem does not make the phenomenon of adversarial examples
worse. Whether the image size is 28× 28 or 200× 200, the weight vector found by linear SVM looks very similar
to the one found by logistic regression in (Goodfellow et al., 2014). The two SVM models have an error rate of
2.7%2. The magnitude  of the perturbations has been chosen in both cases such that 99% of the digits in the
test set are misclassified (28 = 4.6, 200 = 31. ≈ 28 × 200/28)
In sum, the dimensionality argument does not hold: high dimensional problems are not necessarily more
prone to the phenomenon of adversarial examples. Without this central result however, can we still maintain
that linear behaviour is sufficient to cause adversarial examples?
3.2 Linear behaviour is not sufficient to cause adversarial examples
According to the linear explanation of Goodfellow et al. (2014), linear behaviour itself is responsible for the
existence of adversarial examples. If we take this explanation literally, then we expect all linear classification
problems to suffer from the phenomenon. Yet we can find classes of images for which adversarial examples do
not exist at all. Consider the following toy problem (figure 3).
Let I and J be two classes of images of size 100× 100 defined as follow:
Class I. Left half-image noisy (random pixel values in [0, 1]) and right half-image black (pixel value: 0).
Class J . Left half-image noisy (random pixel values in [0, 1]) and right half-image white (pixel value: 1).
If we train a linear SVM on 5000 images of each class, we achieve perfect separation of the training data with
full generalisation to novel test data. When we look at the weight vector w defined by SVM, we notice that it
2Better error rates can be obtained by using less regularisation, as shown in section 4.4.
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correctly represents the feature separating the two classes: it ignores the left half-image (all weights near zero)
and takes into consideration the entire right half-image (all weights near 1). As a result, adversarial examples
do not exist. Indeed, if we take an image in one of the two classes and move in the gradient direction until we
reach the class boundary, then we get an image that is also perceived as being between the two classes according
to human observers (grey right half-image); and if we continue to move in the gradient direction until we reach
a confidence level that the new image belongs to the new class equal to the confidence level that the original
image belonged to the original class, then we get an image that is also perceived as belonging to the new class
according to human observers.
5000 
Class I images
Weight vector
w Class I
Class J
SVM
5000 
Class J images
move in the
direction of
w
Original images Projected images Mirror images
move in the
direction of
-w
move in the
direction of
-w
move in the
direction of
w
Figure 3: Toy problem of two classes I and J that do not suffer from the phenomenon of adversarial examples.
When we follow the procedure that normally leads to the creation of adversarial examples, we get instead real
instances of images that belong to the other class. We call the images on the boundary the projected images and
the images with opposed classification score the mirror images.
This toy problem is very artificial and the point we make from it might seem little convincing for the moment,
but it should not be disputed that there is a priori nothing in the current linear explanation that allows us to
predict which classes of images will suffer from the phenomenon of adversarial examples, and which will not.
In the following section we consider a more realistic problem: MNIST. We will return to the toy problem in
section 4.3.
3.3 Linear classification on MNIST. Are these examples really adversarial?
A key argument in favour of the linear explanation of adversarial examples was that logistic regression also
suffers from the phenomenon. In contrast, we argue here that what happens with linear classifiers on MNIST is
very different from what happens with deep networks on ImageNet.
The first difference between the two situations is very clear: the adversarial perturbations have a much higher
magnitude and are very perceptible by human observers in the case of linear classifiers on MNIST (see figure 1).
Importantly, the image resolution cannot account for this difference: increasing the size of the MNIST images
does not influence the perceptual magnitude of the adversarial perturbations (as shown in section 3.1). Not only
does the linear explanation unreliably predict whether the phenomenon of adversarial examples will occur on a
specific dataset (as shown in section 3.2), it also cannot predict the magnitude of the adversarial perturbations
necessary to make the classifier change its predictions when the phenomenon does occur.
Another important difference between the adversarial examples shown in (Goodfellow et al., 2014) for
GoogLeNet on ImageNet and the ones shown for logistic regression on MNIST concerns the appearance of
the adversarial perturbations. With GoogLeNet on ImageNet, the perturbation is dominated by high-frequency
structure which cannot be meaningfully interpreted; with logistic regression on MNIST, the perturbation is
low-frequency dominated and although Goodfellow et al. (2014) argue that it is “not readily recognizable to a
human observer as having anything to do with the relationship between 3s and 7s”, we believe that it can be
meaningfully interpreted: the weight vector found by logistic regression points in a direction that is close to
passing through the mean images of the two classes, thus defining a decision boundary similar to the one of a
nearest centroid classifier (see figure 4).
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(a) Average 3 (left) and average 7 (mid-
dle) on the MNIST training data. Dif-
ference between the two (right).
(b) Weights vectors: SVM on the 200 × 200 images (left),
SVM on the 28 × 28 images (middle), logistic regression in
(Goodfellow et al., 2014), (right).
Figure 4: The weight vectors found by linear models resemble the average 3 of the MNIST training data to
which the average 7 has been subtracted.
Simple linear models defined by SVM or logistic regression can be deceived on MNIST by perturbations that
are visually perceptible and that look roughly like the weight vector of the nearest centroid classifier. This result
is hardly surprising and does not help explain why much more sophisticated models — such as deep networks
— can be deceived by imperceptible perturbations which look to human observers like random noise. Clearly,
the linear explanation is still incomplete.
4 The Boundary Tilting Perspective
4.1 Pictorial solution to the adversarial examples paradox
In previous sections, we rejected the linear explanation of Goodfellow et al. (2014): high dimension is insufficient
to explain the phenomenon of adversarial examples and linear models seem to suffer from a weaker type of
adversarial examples than deep networks. Without the linear explanation however, the adversarial examples
paradox persists: how can two classes of images be well separated, if every element of each class is close to an
element of the other class?
In figure 5a, we present a schematic representation of the solution proposed in (Szegedy et al., 2013): the
classes ◦ and + are well separated, but every element of each class is very close to an element of the other class
because low probability adversarial pockets are densely distributed in image space. In figure 5b, we introduce a
new solution. First, we observe that the data sampled in the training and test sets only extends in a submanifold
of the image space. A class boundary can intersect this submanifold such that the two classes are well separated,
but will also extend beyond it. Under certain circumstances, the boundary might be lying very close to the data,
such that small perturbations directed towards the boundary might cross it.
Dense distribution 
of “low probability 
pockets”
Image space
(a) The solution proposed in (Szegedy et al., 2013).
Adversarial examples are possible because the image
space is densely filled with low probability adversarial
pockets.
           
Image space
The boundary is
“outside the box”
Submanifold of 
sampled data
(b) The solution we propose. Adversarial examples
are possible because the class boundary extends be-
yond the submanifold of sample data and can be —
under certain circumstances — lying close to it.
Figure 5: Schematic representations of two solutions to the adversarial examples paradox.
Note that in the low dimensional representation of figure 5b, randomly perturbed images are likely to cross
the class boundary. In higher dimension however, the probability that a random perturbation moves exactly
in the direction of the boundary is low, such that images that are close to it (and thus sensitive to adversarial
perturbations), are robust to random perturbations, in accordance with the results in (Szegedy et al., 2013).
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4.2 Adversarial examples in linear classification
The drawing of figure 5b is, of course, a severe oversimplification of the reality — but it is a useful one. As we
noticed already, it is a low dimensional impression of a phenomenon happening in much higher dimension. It also
misrepresents the complexity of real data distributions and the highly non-linear nature of the class boundary
defined by a state-of-the-art classifier. Yet it is useful because it allows us to make important predictions. First,
the drawing is compatible with a flat class boundary and no non-linearity is required (contrary to the view relying
on the presence of low probability pockets). Hence the phenomenon of adversarial examples should be observable
in linear classification. At the same time, linear behaviour is not sufficient for the phenomenon to occur either:
the class boundary needs to “be tilted” and lie close to the data. In the following, we propose a mathematical
analysis of this boundary tilting explanation in linear classification. We start by giving a strict condition for the
non-existence of adversarial examples, from which we deduce a measure of strength for the adversarial examples
affecting a class of images. We also show that the adversarial strength can be reduced to a simple parameter:
the deviation angle between the classifier considered and the nearest centroid classifier. Then, we introduce the
boundary tilting mechanism and show that it can lead to adversarial examples of arbitrary strength without
affecting classification performance. Finally, we propose a new taxonomy of adversarial examples.
4.2.1 Condition for the non-existence of adversarial examples
In the standard procedure, adversarial examples are found by moving along the gradient direction by a magnitude
 chosen such that 99% of the data is misclassified (Goodfellow et al., 2014). The smaller  is, the more
“impressive” the resulting adversarial examples. This approach is meaningful when  is very small — but as
 grows, when should one stop considering the images obtained as adversarial examples? When they start to
actually look like images of the other class? Or when the adversarial perturbation starts to be perceptible to the
human eye? Here, we introduce a strict condition for the non-existence of adversarial examples.
Let I and J be two classes of images, and C a hyperplane boundary defining a linear classifier in Rn. C is
formally specified by a normal weight vector c (we assume that ‖c‖2 = 1) and a bias c0. For any image x in Rn,
we define:
• The classification score of x through C as: d(x, C) = x · c+ c0
d(x, C) is the signed distance between x and C.
x is classified in I if d(x, C) ≤ 0 and x is classified in J if d(x, C) ≥ 0.
• The projected image of x on C as: p(x, C) = x− d(x, C) c
p(x, C) is the nearest image y lying on C (i.e. such that d(y, C) = 0).
• The mirror image of x through C as: m(x, C) = x− 2 d(x, C) c
m(x, C) is the nearest image y with opposed classification score (i.e. such that d(y, C) = −d(x, C)).
• The mirror class of I through C as: m(I, C) = {m(x, C) | ∀x ∈ I}
Suppose that C does not suffer from adversarial examples. Then for every image x in I, the projected image
p(x, C) must lie exactly between the classes I and J . Since p(x, C) is the midpoint between x and the mirror
image m(x, C), we can say that p(x, C) lies exactly between I and J iff m(x, C) belongs to J . Hence we can say
that the class I does not suffer from adversarial examples iff m(I, C) ⊂ J . Similarly, we can say that the class
J does not suffer from adversarial examples iff m(J, C) ⊂ I. Since the mirror operation is involutive, we have
m(I, C) ⊂ J ⇒ I ⊂ m(J, C) and m(J, C) ⊂ I ⇒ J ⊂ m(I, C). Hence:
C does not suffer from adversarial examples ⇔ m(I, C) = J and m(J, C) = I
The non-existence of adversarial examples is equivalent to the classes I and J being mirror classes of each other
through C, or to the mirror operator m(·, C) defining a bijection between I and J . Conversely, we say that a
classification boundary C suffers from adversarial examples iff m(I, C) 6= J and m(J, C) 6= I. In that case, we
call adversarial examples affecting I the elements of m(I, C) that are not in J and we call adversarial examples
affecting J the elements of m(J, C) that are not in I.
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4.2.2 Strength of the adversarial examples affecting a class of images
As discussed before, the magnitude  of the adversarial perturbations used in the standard procedure is a good
measure of how “impressive” or “strong” the adversarial examples are. Unfortunately, this measure is only
meaningful for small values. We introduce here a measure of strength that is valid on the entire spectrum of the
adversarial example phenomenon.
Maximum strength. Let us note i and j the mean images of I and J respectively. For an element x in I, the
“strength” of the adversarial example m(x, C) is maximised when the distance ‖x−m(x, C)‖ tends to 0
(this is equivalent to  tending to 0 in the standard procedure). Averaging over all the elements of I, we can
say that the strength of the adversarial examples affecting I is maximised when the distance ‖i−m(i, C)‖
tends to 0 (see figure 6).
I i
J
j
m(i,C)m(I,C)C
Figure 6: The smaller the distance ‖i−m(i, C)‖, the stronger the adversarial examples affecting I.
Remark that ‖i−m(i, C)‖ = 2 |d(i, C)| and consider the projections of the elements in I along the direction
c: their mean value is d(i, C) and we note σ their standard deviation. Consider in particular the elements
X in I that are more than one standard deviation away from the mean in the direction c: for each element
x in X we have d(i, C) + σ ≤ d(x, C). If there are no strong outliers in the data, a significant proportion
of the elements of I belongs to X, and if the classifier C has a good performance, some of the elements in
X must be correctly classified in I, i.e. some elements in X must verify d(x, C) < 0. Hence we must have
d(i, C) + σ < 0 and |d(i, C)| > σ. We can thus write: ‖i−m(i, C)‖ = 2 |d(i, C)| > 2σ. The strength of the
adversarial examples affecting I is maximised (‖i−m(i, C)‖ → 0) when there is a direction c of very small
variance in the data (σ → 0) and the boundary C lies close to the data along this direction (d(i, C)→ 0).
Minimum strength. We call the hyperplane of the nearest centroid classifier the bisecting boundary, and denote
it B. By definition, B is the unique classification boundary verifying m(i,B) = j (we assume that i 6= j
such that B is well-defined). Remark that we have, for a classification boundary C:
m(I, C) = J =⇒ m(i, C) = j but m(i,B) = j 6=⇒ m(I,B) = J
Hence, if there exists a classification boundary C that does not suffer from adversarial examples on I, then
it is unique and equal to B; but B can suffer from adversarial examples. In the following, we consider that
B minimises the phenomenon of adversarial examples, even when B does suffer from adversarial examples
(see figure 7, left). Then, we can say that the strength of the adversarial examples affecting I is minimised
when the distance ‖j −m(i, C)‖ tends to 0 (see figure 7, right).
I i J
j = m(i,B) m(I,B) B
I i J
m(i,C)
m(I,C) 
C
j
B
Figure 7: Left: the adversarial examples phenomenon is minimised when j = m(i,B) even when J 6= m(I,B).
Right: the smaller the distance ‖j −m(i, C)‖, the weaker the adversarial examples affecting I.
Based on the previous considerations, and using the arctangent in order to bound the values in the finite
interval [0, pi/2[, we formally define the strength s(I, C) of the adversarial examples affecting I through C as:
s(I, C) = arctan
(‖j −m(i, C)‖
‖i−m(i, C)‖
)
s(I, C) is maximised at pi/2 when ‖i−m(i, C)‖ → 0 and minimised at 0 when ‖j −m(i, C)‖ → 0
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4.2.3 The adversarial strength is the deviation angle
In our analysis, the bisecting boundary B of the nearest centroid classifier plays a special role: it minimises the
strength of the adversarial examples affecting I and J . We note b its normal weight vector (we assume that
‖b‖2 = 1) and b0 its bias. Given a classifier C specified by a normal weight vector c and a bias c0, we call
deviation angle of C with regards to B the angle δc between c and b. More precisely, we can express c as a
function of b, a unit vector orthogonal to b that we note b⊥c , and the deviation angle δc as:
c = cos(δc) b+ sin(δc) b
⊥
c
We can then derive (see appendix A) the strengths of the adversarial examples affecting I and J through C in
terms of the deviation angle δc and the ratio rc = c0/ ‖i‖ (with the origin 0 at the midpoint between i and j):
s(I, C) = arctan

√
sin2(δc) + r2c
cos(δc) + rc
 and s(J, C) = arctan

√
sin2(δc) + r2c
cos(δc)− rc

Effect of rc:
If we assume that C separates i and j, then we must have − cos(δc) < rc < cos(δc).
When rc → − cos(δc), we have: s(I, C)→ pi/2 and s(J, C)→ pi/2− arctan(2 cos(δc)).
When rc → cos(δc), we have: s(I, C)→ pi/2− arctan(2 cos(δc)), and s(J, C)→ pi/2.
The parameter rc controls the relative strengths of the adversarial examples affecting I and J . It can lead
to strong adversarial examples on one class at a time (see figure 8).
C
I J
m(I,C)
m(J,C)
rc = 0
C
I J
m(I,C)
m(J,C)
c0
rc →  cos(δc)
C
I J
m(I,C)
m(J,C)
c0
rc →  -cos(δc)
Figure 8: The parameter rc controls the relative strengths of the adversarial examples affecting I and J .
In the following, we assume that rc ≈ 0, so that:
s(I, C) ≈ s(J, C) ≈ s(C) = arctan

√
sin2(δc)
cos(δc)
 = |δc|
In words, when C passes close to the mean of the classes centroids (rc ≈ 0), the strength of the adversarial
examples affecting I is approximately equal to the strength of the adversarial examples affecting J and can be
reduced to the deviation angle |δc|. In that case we can speak of the adversarial strength without mentioning
the class affected: it is minimised for δc = 0 (i.e. C ≈ B) and maximised when |δc| tends to pi/2.
4.2.4 Boundary tilting and its influence on classification
In previous sections, we defined the notion of adversarial strength and showed that it can be reduced to the
deviation angle between the weight vector c of the classifier considered and the weight vector b of the nearest
centroid classifier. Here, we evaluate the effect on the classification performance of tilting the weight vector c by
an angle θ along an arbitrary direction.
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Let z be a unit vector that we call the zenith direction. We can express c as a function of z, a unit vector
orthogonal to z that we note z⊥c and an angle θc that we call the inclination angle of C along z:
c = cos(θc) z
⊥
c + sin(θc) z
We say that we tilt the boundary C along the zenith direction z by an angle θ when we define a new boundary
Cθ specified by its normal weight vector cθ and its bias cθ0 as follow:
cθ = cos(θc + θ) z
⊥
c + sin(θc + θ) z
cθ0 = c0 cos(θc + θ)/ cos(θc)
Let S be the set of all the images in I and J . Abusing the notation, we refer to the sets of all classification scores
through C and Cθ by d(S, C) and d(S, Cθ). We can show (see appendix B) that:
d(S, C) = u · P and d(S, Cθ) = uθ · P
Where u = (cos(θc), sin(θc)) and uθ = (cos(θc + θ), sin(θc + θ)) are the unit vectors rotated by the angles θc
and θc + θ relatively to the x-axis and P = S · (z⊥c + c0/ cos(θc), z)> is the projection of S on the plane (z⊥c , z)
horizontally translated by c0/ cos(θc).
Now we define the rate of change between C and Cθ and note roc(θ) the proportion of elements in S that are
classified differently by C and Cθ (i.e. the elements x in S for which sign(d(x, C)) 6= sign(d(x, Cθ))). In general,
we cannot deduce a closed-form expression of roc(θ). However, we can represent it graphically in the plane
(z⊥c , z) and we see that roc(θ) is small as long as the variance of the data in S along the zenith direction z is
small and the angle θc + θ is not too close to pi/2 (see figure 9).
       
Cθ
C z
θc
θc + θ
zc
┴
P u
uθ
Figure 9: The rate of change roc(θ) is the proportion of elements in P classified differently by C and Cθ (dark
grey area in the figure). It is small as long as the variance of the data in S along z is small and the angle θc + θ
is not too close to pi/2.
Let us note v⊥z and vz the variances of the data in S along the directions z
⊥
c and z respectively. We present
below two situations of interest where roc(θ) can be expressed in closed-form.
1. When P is flat along the zenith component (i.e. when vz is null), we have:
d(S, C) = cos(θc) (S · z⊥c + c0/ cos(θc)) and d(S, Cθ) = cos(θc + θ) (S · z⊥c + c0/ cos(θc))
Hence:
d(S, Cθ) = cos(θc + θ)
cos(θc)
d(S, C)
For all θc + θ in ] − pi/2, pi/2[, the sign of d(S, Cθ) is equal to the sign of d(S, C): every element of S is
classified in the same way by C and Cθ and roc(θ) = 0.
When the variance along the zenith direction is null, the classification of the elements in S is unaffected
by the tilting of the boundary.
2. When P follows a bivariate normal distribution N (0,Σ) with Σ = diag(v⊥z , vz), then we can show (see
appendix C) that:
roc(θ) =
1
pi
[
arctan
(√
vz
v⊥z
tan(x)
)]θc+θ
θc
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For instance if v⊥z = 1 and vz = 10
−6, and the boundaries C and Cθ are tilted at 10% and 90% respectively
along z (θc = 0.1pi/2 and θc + θ = 0.9pi/2)), then we have roc(θ) = 0.2%.
When the variance along the zenith direction is small enough, the classification of the elements in S is very
lightly affected by the tilting of the boundary.
4.2.5 Boundary tilting at the origin of strong adversarial examples
Finally, we show that the boundary tilting mechanism can lead to the existence of strong adversarial examples,
without affecting the classification performance.
Imagine that we choose the zenith direction z orthogonal to b. Then we can express z⊥c as a function of b, a
unit vector orthogonal to b (and z) that we note yc and an angle φc that we call the azimuth angle of C with
regards to z and b:
c = cos(θc) [ cos(φc) b+ sin(φc)yc ] + sin(θc) z
Now, imagine that we tilt the boundary C along the zenith direction z while keeping the azimuth angle φc
constant. We can express the weight vector cθ of the tilted boundary Cθ both as a function of its inclination
angle θc + θ and the azimuth angle φc, and as a function of its deviation angle δc + δ:
cθ = cos(θc + θ) [ cos(φc) b+ sin(φc)yc ] + sin(θc + θ) z and cθ = cos(δc + δ) b+ sin(δc + δ) b
⊥
c
We see that the deviation angle δc + δ of Cθ depends on the inclination angle θc + θ and the azimuth angle φc:
cos(δc + δ) = cos(θc + θ) cos(φc)
In order for Cθ to suffer from strong adversarial examples (i.e. |δc + δ| → pi/2), it is sufficient to tilt along a
zenith direction z orthogonal to b (i.e. |θc + θ| → pi/2). If in addition the direction z is such that the variance
vz is small, then the rate of change roc(θ) will be small and the classification boundaries C and Cθ will perform
similarly (when vz = 0, C and Cθ perform exactly in the same way: see figure 10).
For any classification boundary C, there always exist a tilted boundary Cθ such that C and Cθ perform
in the same way (vz = 0) or almost in the same way (0 < vz  1), and Cθ suffers from adversarial
examples of arbitrary strength (as long as there are directions of low variance in the data).
C
I
J
δc θc
φc
b
yc
z
c
zc
┴
Figure 10: Illustration in 3 dimensions of the relationship between the deviation angle δc, the inclination angle
θc and the azimuth angle φc. When the variance vz is null and the azimuth angle φc is kept constant, it is
possible to have the deviation angle δc approaching pi/2 (resulting in strong adversarial examples) by tilting
along the direction z without affecting the classification performance.
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4.2.6 Taxonomy of adversarial examples
Given a classifier C, we note δ(C) its deviation angle and er(C) its error rate on S. In the following, we analyse
the distribution of all linear classifiers in the deviation angle - error rate diagram. To start with, we consider the
nearest centroid classifier B as a baseline and discard all classifiers with an error rate superior to er(B) as poorly
performing. We also note ermin the minimum error rate achievable on S (in general, ermin < er(B)). For a given
error rate comprised between er(B) and ermin, we say that a classifier is optimal if it minimises the deviation angle.
In particular, we call label boundary and we note L the optimal classifier verifying er(L) = ermin. In the deviation
angle - error rate diagram, the set of optimal classifiers forms a strictly decreasing curve segment connecting B
(minimising the strength of the adversarial examples) to L (minimising the error rate). Any classifier with a
deviation angle greater than δ(L) is then necessarily suboptimal: there is always another classifier performing
at least as well and suffering from weaker adversarial examples (see figure 11).
Based on these considerations, we propose to define the following taxonomy:
Type 0: adversarial examples affecting B. They minimise the phenomenon of adversarial examples.
Type 1: adversarial examples affecting the classifiers C such that 0 ≤ δ(C) ≤ δ(L). They affect in particular
the optimal classifiers. The inconvenience of their existence is balanced by the performance gains allowed.
Type 2: adversarial examples affecting the classifiers C such that δ(L) < δ(C). They only affect suboptimal
classifiers resulting from the tilting of optimal classifiers along directions of low variance.
Let us call training boundary and note T the boundary defined by a standard classification method such as
SVM or logistic regression. In practice, I and J are unlikely to be mirror classes of each other through B and
hence T is expected to at least suffer from type 0 adversarial examples. In fact, B is also unlikely to minimise
the error rate on S and if T performs better than B, then T is also expected to suffer from type 1 adversarial
examples. Note that there is no restriction in theory on δ(L) and on some problems, type 1 adversarial examples
can be very strong. However, T is a priori not expected to suffer from type 2 adversarial examples: why would
SVM or logistic regression define a classifier that is suboptimal in such a way? In the following two sections,
we show experimentally with SVM that the regularisation level plays a crucial role in controlling the deviation
angle of T . When the regularisation level is very strong (i.e. when the SVM margin contains all the data),
T converges towards B and the deviation angle is null. When SVM is correctly regularised, T is allowed to
deviate from B sufficiently to converge towards L: the optimal classifier minimising the error rate. However
when the regularisation level is too low, the inclination of T along directions of low variance ends up overfitting
the training data, resulting in the existence of strong type 2 adversarial examples.
poorly performing classifiers
0 π/2
δ
er
B
0.5
L Tclassifiers
Type 1 Type 2
optimal
titling of L
(0 < vz << 1)
titling of L
(vz = 0) ermin
(low reg.)
Type 0
Figure 11: Deviation Angle - Error Rate diagram. The position of the optimal classifiers, including in particular
the bisecting boundary B and the label boundary L, is indicated. The effect of tilting L along a direction of
no variance (vz = 0) or low variance (0 < vz  1), is also illustrated. This mechanism results in a training
boundary T that suffers from strong type 2 adversarial examples when the level of regularisation used is low.
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4.3 Return to the toy problem
In light of the mathematical analysis presented in the previous sections, we now return to the toy problem
introduced in section 3.2 (see figure 3). Firstly, we can confirm that the boundary defined by SVM satisfies
the condition we gave for the non-existence of adversarial examples: the weight vector w is equal to the weight
vector b of the nearest centroid classifier B (see figure 12) and we have m(I,B) = J and m(J,B) = I. Indeed,
mirroring an image that belongs to I through B changes the colour of its right half image from black to white
and results in an image that belongs to J (and conversely).
Secondly, we can illustrate the effect of the regularisation level used on the deviation angle (and hence on the
adversarial strength). To start with, we modify the toy problem such that ermin > 0 (when ermin = 0, overfitting
is not likely to happen). We do this by corrupting 5% of the images in I and J into fully randomised images,
such that ermin = 2.5% (half of the corrupted data is necessarily misclassified). Note that on this problem,
er(B) = ermin, hence B = L and B is the only optimal classifier. When we perform SVM with regularisation
(soft-margin), we obtain a weight vector wsoft approximately equal to b (see figure 13). The small deviation can
be explained by the fact that the training data has been slightly overfitted (the training error is 2.2% < ermin) and
corresponds to very weak adversarial examples. Without regularisation however (hard-margin), the deviation of
the weight vector whard is very strong (see figure 14). In that case, the training data is completely overfitted
(the training error is 0%), resulting in the existence of strong type 2 adversarial examples. Interestingly, these
adversarial examples possess the same characteristics as the ones observed with GoogLeNet on ImageNet in
(Goodfellow et al., 2014) — the perturbation is barely perceptible, high-frequency and cannot be meaningfully
interpreted — even though the classifier is linear.
Finally, we can visualise the boundary tilting mechanism by plotting the projections of the data on the plane
(b, z), where z is the zenith direction along which whard is tilted (see figure 15). We observe in particular how the
overfitting of the corrupted data leads to the existence of the strong type 2 adversarial examples: maximising the
minimal separation of the two classes (the margin) results in a very small average separation (making adversarial
examples possible). This effect is very reminiscent of the data piling phenomenon studied by Marron et al. (2007)
and Ahn and Marron (2010) on high-dimension low-sample size data.
4.4 Return to MNIST
We now revisit the 3s vs 7s MNIST problem. In particular, we study the effect of varying the regular-
isation level by performing SVM classification with seven different values for the soft-margin parameter:
log10(C) = −5,−4,−3,−2,−1, 0 and 1. The first remark we can make is that there is a strong, direct cor-
relation between the deviation angle of the weight vector defined by SVM and the regularisation level used (see
figure 16, left). When regularisation is high (i.e. when C is low), the SVM weight vector is very close to the
weight vector of the nearest centroid classifier b (δ = 0.048pi/2). Conversely when regularisation is low (i.e.
when C is high), the SVM weight vector is almost orthogonal to b (δ = 0.92pi/2). As expected, the error rate on
test data is minimised for an intermediate level of regularisation and overfitting happens for low regularisation:
for log10(C) = −1, 0 and 1, the error rate on training data approaches 0% while the error rate on test data
increases (see figure 16, right).
When we look at the SVM weight vector w for the different levels of regularisation (see figure 17, left), we
see that it initially resembles the weight vector of the nearest centroid classifier (log10(C) = −5), then deviates
away into relatively low frequency directions (log10(C) = −4,−3 and −2) before deviating into higher frequency
directions, resulting in a “random noise aspect”, when the training data starts to be overfitted (log10(C) = −1, 0
and 1). Let us consider B the one-dimensional subspace of R784 generated by b, and B⊥ the 783-dimensional
subspace of R784, orthogonal complement of B. We note Xtrain and Ytrain the projections of the training set Strain
on B and B⊥ respectively and we perform a principal component analysis of Ytrain, resulting in the 783 principal
vectors u1, ..., u783. Then, we decompose B
⊥ into 27 subspaces U1, ..., U27 of 29 dimensions each, such that U1
is generated by u1, ...,u29, U2 is generated by u30, ...,u58, ..., and U27 is generated by u755, ...,u783. For each
13
j i b- =w
Figure 12: The weight vector w obtained using SVM in figure 3 is equal to the weight vector b of the nearest
centroid classifier, obtained by subtracting the mean image i of the class I to the mean image j of the class J .
5000
Class I images Class I
Class J
SVM
(soft-margin)
5000
Class J images
move in the
direction of
wsoft
Original images Projected images Mirror images
move in the
direction of
-wsoft
move in the
direction of
-wsoft
move in the
direction of
wsoft
95%
5%
95%
5%
1 2 3
4 5 6
Weight vector
wsoft
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Figure 13: Left: toy problem where 5% of the data is corrupted to purely random images such that the two
classes are not linearly separable (ermin = 2.5%). With a proper level of regularisation (soft-margin), the training
data is only slightly overfitted (ertrain = 2.2%) and the weight vector wsoft defined by SVM only deviates slightly
from b (δ(wsoft) = 0.032pi/2). Right: as a result, adversarial examples are very weak.
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Figure 14: Left: same toy problem as before. Without regularisation (with hard-margin), the training data
is entirely overfitted (ertrain = 0%) and the weight vector whard defined by SVM deviates from b considerably
(δ(whard) = 0.97pi/2). Right: as a result, adversarial examples are very strong.
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Tilting by θ
Figure 15: Projection of the training data in the plane (b, z) where z = normalise(whard − (whard · b) b). The
images in I appear on the left, the images in J appear on the right, and the corrupted images appear in the
middle. The soft-margin and hard-margin boundaries are drawn as dashed red lines. Note that the hard-margin
boundary overfits the training data by finding a direction that separates the corrupted data completely (this
separation does not generalise to novel test data). The positions of the original images, projected images and
mirror images of the figures 13 and 14 are also shown: the adversarial examples III and VI of the hard-margin
boundary are much closer to their respective original images than the adversarial examples 3 and 6 of the
soft-margin boundary.
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weight vector w, we decompose it into a component x in B and a component y in B⊥ and we project y on each
subspace U1, ..., U27 (see figure 17, middle). The norms of the projections of y are shown as orange bar charts
and the square roots of the total variances in each subspace U1, ..., U27 are shown as blue curves. We see that
for log10(C) = −4,−3 and −2, y is dominated by components of high variance, while for log10(C) = −1, 0 and
1, y starts to be more dominated by components of low variance: this result confirms that overfitting happens
by the tilting of the boundary along components of low variance. Note that w never tilts along flat directions
of variation (corresponding to the subspaces U23, ..., U27) because for overfitting to take place, there needs to be
some variance in the tilting direction. Interestingly, optimal classification seems to happen when each direction is
used proportionally to the amount of variance it contains: for log10(C) = −2, the bar chart follows the blue curve
faithfully. Finally, we can look at the adversarial examples affecting each weight vector (see figure 17, right). In
particular, we look at the images of 3s in the test set that are at a median distance from each boundary (median
images). We see that the mirror images are closer to their respective original images when the regularisation
level is low, resulting in stronger adversarial examples. For log10(C) = −5, the deviation angle is almost null
and we can say that the corresponding adversarial example is of type 0. For log10(C) = −4,−3 and −2, the
increase in deviation angle is associated with an increase in performance and we can say that the corresponding
adversarial examples are of type 1. However, for log10(C) = −1, 0 and 1, the increase in deviation angle only
results in overfitting, and we can say that the corresponding adversarial examples are of type 2.
These type 2 adversarial examples, like those found on the toy problem, have similar characteristics to the
ones affecting GoogLeNet on ImageNet (the adversarial perturbation is barely perceptible and high-frequency).
Hence we may hypothesize that the adversarial examples affecting deep networks are also of type 2, originating
from a non-linear equivalent of boundary-tilting and caused by overfitting. If this hypothesis is correct, then
these adversarial examples might also be fixable by using adapted regularisation. Unfortunately, straightforward
l2 regularisation only works when the classification method operates on pixel values: as soon as the regularisation
term is applied in a feature space that does not directly reflect pixel distance, it does not effectively prevent
the existence of type 2 adversarial examples any more. We illustrate this by performing linear SVM with soft-
margin regularisation after two different standard preprocessing methods: pixelwise normalisation and PCA
whitening. In the two cases, the soft-margin parameter C is chosen such that the performance is maximised,
resulting in a slight boost in performance both for pixelwise normalisation (ertest = 1.2%) and for PCA whitening
(ertest = 1.5%). Since the preprocessing steps are linear transformations, we can then project the weight vectors
obtained back into the original pixel space. We get a deviation angle for the weight vector defined after pixelwise
normalisation that is stronger than that of any weight vector defined without preprocessing (δ = 0.95pi/2) and a
deviation angle for the weight vector defined after PCA whitening that appears orthogonal to b (δ = 1.00pi/2).
The two weight vectors (see figure 18, left) have a very peculiar aspect: both are strongly dominated by a
few pixels, in the periphery of the image for the weight vector defined after pixelwise normalisation and in the
top right corner for the weight vector defined after PCA whitening. When we look at the magnitudes of the
projections of the y components on the subspaces U1, ..., U27, we see that the dominant pixels correspond to
the components where the variance of the data is smallest but non-null (see figure 18, middle). Effectively, the
rescaling of the components of very low variance puts a disproportionate weight on them, forcing the boundary
to tilt very significantly. The phenomenon is particularly extreme with PCA whitening where due to numerical
approximations, some residual variance was found in components that were not supposed to contain any, and
ended up strongly dominating the weight vector3. The resulting adversarial examples are unusual (see figure 18,
right). For the pixelwise normalisation preprocessing step, it is possible to change the class of an image by
altering the value of pixels that do not affect the digit itself. For the PCA whitening preprocessing step, the
perturbation is absolutely non-perceptible: the pixel distance between the original image and the corresponding
adversarial example is in the order of 10−18. With such a small distance, classification is now very sensitive to
any perturbation, whether it is adversarial or random (despite this obvious weakness, this classifier performs
very well on normal data).
3This effect could be avoided by putting a threshold on the minimum variance necessary before rescaling, as is sometimes done
in practice.
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overfitting
Figure 16: Left: the deviation angle of the weight vector defined by SVM increases almost linearly with the
log10 of the soft-margin parameter C. Right: The error rate on training data decreases with log10(C). The
error rate on test data is minimised for an intermediate level of regularisation (log10(C) = −2) and overfitting
happens for low levels of regularisation (log10(C) = −1, 0 and 1).
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Figure 17: Left: weight vector w defined by SVM for different levels of regularisation (controlled with the
soft-margin parameter C). Middle: decomposition of w into a component x in B and a component y in B⊥.
The orange bar charts represent the magnitudes of the projections of y on the subspaces of decreasing variances
U1, ..., U27 and the blue curves represent the square root of the total variance in each subspace. Right: Median
3, its projected image and its mirror image for each regularisation level.
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Figure 18: Left: weight vector w defined by SVM with soft-margin after two standard preprocessing methods:
pixelwise normalisation and PCA whitening (projected back in pixel space). Middle: decomposition of w into
a component x in B and a component y in B⊥. Right: Median 3, its projected image and its mirror image for
the two weight vectors.
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5 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the understanding of the adversarial example phenomenon in several different ways.
It introduces in particular:
A new perspective. The phenomenon is captured in one intuitive picture: a submanifold of sampled data,
intersected by a class boundary lying close to it, suffers from adversarial examples.
A new formalism. In linear classification, we proposed a strict condition for the non-existence of adversarial
examples. We defined adversarial examples as elements of the mirror class and introduced the notion of
adversarial strength. Given a classification boundary C, we showed that the adversarial strength can be
measured by the deviation angle between C and the bisecting boundary B of the nearest centroid classifier.
We also defined the boundary tilting mechanism, and showed that there always exists a tilted boundary
Cθ such that C and Cθ perform in very similar ways, and Cθ suffers from adversarial examples of arbitrary
strength (as long as there are directions of low variance in the data).
A new taxonomy. These results led us to define the notion of optimal classifier, minimising the deviation angle
for a given error rate. B is the optimal classifier minimising the adversarial strength and we called label
boundary L the optimal classifier minimising the error rate. When C = B and the two classes of images are
not mirror classes of each other, we say that C suffers from adversarial examples of type 0. When the error
rate of C is strictly inferior to the error rate of B, the deviation angle of C is necessarily strictly positive;
as long as it stays inferior to the deviation angle of L, we say that C suffers from adversarial examples of
type 1. When the deviation angle of C is superior to the deviation angle of L, C is necessarily suboptimal.
In that case we say that C suffers from adversarial examples of type 2.
New experimental results. We introduced a toy problem that does not suffer from adversarial examples, and
presented a minimal set of conditions to provoke the apparition of strong type 2 adversarial examples on
it. We also showed on the 3s vs 7s MNIST problem that in practice, the regularisation level used plays a
key role in controlling the deviation angle, and hence the type of adversarial examples obtained. Type 2
adversarial examples in particular, can be avoided by using a proper level of regularisation. However, we
showed that l2 regularisation only helps when it is applied directly in pixel space.
An important distinction must be drawn between the different types of adversarial examples. On the one hand,
type 0 and type 1 adversarial examples originate from a lack of expressiveness of linear models: their adversarial
perturbations do not correspond to the true features disentangling the classes of images, but they can be inter-
preted (as optimal linear features). On the other hand, type 2 adversarial examples originate from overfitting:
their adversarial perturbations are high frequency and largely meaningless (with a characteristic “random noise
aspect”). Due to their similarity with the type 2 adversarial examples affecting linear classifiers, we hypothe-
sised that the adversarial examples affecting state-of-the-art neural networks are also of type 2, symptomatic of
overfitting and resulting from a non-linear equivalent of boundary tilting. Unfortunately, we do not know how
to effectively regularise deep networks yet. In fact, we do not know whether it is possible to regularise them at
all. Neural networks typically operate in a regime where the number of learnable parameters is higher than the
number of training images and one could imagine that such models are fundamentally vulnerable to adversarial
examples. Perhaps, the adversarial examples phenomenon is to neural systems what Loschmidt’s paradox is to
statistical physics: a theoretical aberration of extremely low probability in practice. When Loschmidt pointed
out that it is possible to create a system that contradicts the second law of thermodynamics (stating that the
entropy of a closed system must always increase) by taking an existing closed system and reversing the mo-
tion direction of all the particles constituting it, Boltzmann is reported to have answered: “Go ahead, reverse
them!”. Similarly, one could then reply to those who worry about the possible existence of adversarial examples
in humans: “Go ahead, generate them!”.
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Appendix
A Expression of the adversarial strength as a function of the deviation angle
By choosing the origin 0 at the midpoint between i and j, we can ensure that b = −i/ ‖i‖ = j/ ‖j‖ and b0 = 0.
We then have:
‖i−m(i, C)‖ = ‖i− i+ 2 d(i, C) c‖
= 2 |d(i, C)|
= 2 |i · c+ c0|
= 2 | cos(δc)(i · b) + sin(δc) (
0︷ ︸︸ ︷
i · b⊥c ) + c0|
= 2 | cos(δc)(i · (−i/ ‖i‖)) + c0|
= 2 | − ‖i‖ cos(δc) + c0|
Similarly, we have:
‖j −m(j, C)‖ = 2 | ‖j‖ cos(δc) + c0|
If we assume that C lies between i and j, then we must have −‖i‖ < c0/ cos(δc) < ‖j‖ and:
‖i−m(i, C)‖ = 2 (‖i‖ cos(δc)− c0)
‖j −m(j, C)‖ = 2 (‖j‖ cos(δc) + c0)
By applying the law of cosines in the triangle im(i, C) j, we have:
‖j −m(i, C)‖ =
√
‖i−m(i, C)‖2 + ‖j − i‖2 − 2 ‖i−m(i, C)‖ ‖j − i‖ cos(δc)
=
√
4 (‖i‖ cos(δc)− c0)2 + 4 ‖i‖2 − 8 (‖i‖ cos(δc)− c0) ‖i‖ cos(δc)
= 2
√
‖i‖2 cos2(δc) + c20 − 2 ‖i‖ cos(δc) c0 + ‖i‖2 − 2 ‖i‖2 cos2(δc) + 2 ‖i‖ cos(δc) c0
= 2
√
‖i‖2 (1− cos2(δc)) + c20
= 2
√
‖i‖2 sin2(δc) + c20
Similarly by applying the law of cosines in the triangle j m(j, C) i, we have:
‖i−m(j, C)‖ = 2
√
‖j‖2 sin2(δc) + c20
Finally by posing rc = c0/ ‖i‖ = c0/ ‖j‖ = 2 c0/ ‖j − i‖, we can write:
s(I, C) = arctan
(‖j −m(i, C)‖
‖i−m(i, C)‖
)
= arctan

√
sin2(δc) + r2c
cos(δc) + rc

s(J, C) = arctan
( ‖i−m(j, C)‖
‖j −m(j, C)‖
)
= arctan

√
sin2(δc) + r2c
cos(δc)− rc

B Expression of the sets of all classification scores through C and Cθ
If we regard S as a data matrix, then we can write:
d(S, C) = S · c+ c0
= S · (cos(θc) z⊥c + sin(θc) z) + c0
= cos(θc) (S · z⊥c ) + sin(θc) (S · z) + c0
= cos(θc) (S · z⊥c + c0/ cos(θc)) + sin(θc) (S · z)
= (cos(θc), sin(θc)) · S · (z⊥c + c0/ cos(θc), z)>
= V · P
With V = (cos(θc), sin(θc)) and P = S · (z⊥c + c0/ cos(θc), z)>.
Similarly we have: d(S, Cθ) = Vθ · P
With Vθ = (cos(θc + θ), sin(θc + θ))
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C Expression of roc(θ) when P follows a bivariate normal distribution
With covariance Σ1 = diag(1, 1):
       
Cθ
C z
θc
θc + θ
zc
┴
u
uθ
     θc + θ zc┴
uθ
  
C
θc zc
┴
u
Z
Cθ
Z
roc(C,Cθ,Σ1) = roc(Z,Cθ,Σ1) - roc(Z,C,Σ1)
roc(θ) = roc(C, Cθ,Σ1) = roc(Z, Cθ,Σ1)− roc(Z, C,Σ1) = θc + θ
pi
− θc
pi
=
θ
pi
With covariance Σ2 = diag(v
⊥
z , vz):
     
C2
θ2
zc
┴
u2
Z
  
C1
θ1
zc
┴
u1
Z
roc(Z,C1,Σ1)
y.
x. y
x
√v z
√v z ┴
roc(Z,C2,Σ2)⇔
We have:
roc(Z, C2,Σ2) = roc(Z, C1,Σ1) = θ1
pi
We also have:
tan(θ1) =
√
vz
v⊥z
y
x
=
√
vz
v⊥z
tan(θ2) ⇒ θ1 = arctan
(√
vz
v⊥z
tan(θ2)
)
Hence:
roc(Z, C2,Σ2) = 1
pi
arctan
(√
vz
v⊥z
tan(θ2)
)
And:
roc(θ) = roc(Z, Cθ,Σ2)− roc(Z, C,Σ2)
=
1
pi
[
arctan
(√
vz
v⊥z
tan(θc + θ)
)
− arctan
(√
vz
v⊥z
tan(θc)
)]
=
1
pi
[
arctan
(√
vz
v⊥z
tan(x)
)]θc+θ
θc
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